

January 19, 1966

JFK(U)(B)

SECRET**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS**

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any [redacted] without the concurrence and coordination of [redacted]. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of [redacted] before approaching for recruitment any [redacted]. [redacted] will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of [redacted]. (S)

(3) CIA will advise [redacted] prior to any planned meeting between [redacted] of known or presumed interest to [redacted] (this would include all [redacted] for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) [redacted] [redacted] will be identified to [redacted] by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, [redacted] [redacted] will be advised and [redacted] will confer regarding the handling of [redacted]. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal (S)

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JFK (1)(B)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS [REDACTED]

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security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent [REDACTED] CIA will service [REDACTED] security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide [REDACTED] all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to [REDACTED] internal security interests, [REDACTED] will have direct access to the agent. (S)

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 (JFK)

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddell Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716, 1726, 1728, 1748, 1750)

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
 RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
 IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
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3. NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV (S) JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a Soviet defector who had been placed under CIA control in Europe. The Bureau had been interested in interviewing Khokhlov as soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreed to by CIA. Without notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted Khokhlov to arrive in the United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional committee. We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject in any detail. (Re: Nikolai Khokhlov) (S) JFK (1)(B)

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originating in this case to CIA. The source was a key double agent in one of the most important cases handled by the Bureau, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned. (Re: MOCASE)

5. CASE OF SYLVIA PRESS JFK (1)(B)

(S) Sylvia Press was a CIA employee whom that Agency considered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its own investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. We considered this most uncooperative and we protested. (Re: Sylvia Press) (S) JFK (1)(B)

6. DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954

Dr. Otto John, a West German security official, defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954. A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were collected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing Dr. Otto John and permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau")

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7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in [redacted]] This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. [Re: [redacted]] (S) JFK (1) (B) (U) (S) JFK (1) (B)

10. [redacted] (S) JFK (1) (B)

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with [redacted] and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA. (105-19001) (S) (U) (S) JFK (1) (B)

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956 General Trudeau ^(S) ^{JFK (U) (B)} former head of G-2, made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." Trudeau ^(S) ^{JFK (U) (B)} furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the United States Government")

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays particularly related to investigations of applicant matters being handled by the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19, 1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA")

13. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that William P. Bundy would serve as a secretary for the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. Bundy, son-in-law of Dean Acheson, admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. At the time of this contribution, Bundy was in the same law firm with Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss.

Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy, this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect in dealings with CIA.

14. ~~DR.~~ SAMUEL ABRAHAM GOUDSMIT ^(S) ^{JFK (U) (B)}

^{JFK (U) (B)} ~~Dr.~~ Goudsmit ^(S) was a leading scientist assigned to the Brookhaven National Laboratory. He had been used as a consultant by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA. In October, 1955, he met a Soviet scientist and, with the knowledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. Goudsmit informed ^(S) ^{JFK (U) (B)}

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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re: Dr. [Samuel Abraham Goudsmit]) (S) JFK (1)(B)

15. [] (S) JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)
JFK (1)(A)
JFK (1)(B)
JFK (1)(A)
JFK (1)(A)
(S) On July 20, 1956, we determined that one [] had been in contact with [] Military Attache, Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that [] was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning [] reported contacts with []. We later interviewed [], and it was indicated that [] in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with [] Military Attache. We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956) []

[] (S) JFK (1)(A)

16. [] (S) JFK (1)(A)

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: []) (S) JFK (1)(A)

17. [] (S) JFK (1)(A)

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956,

[] (S) JFK (1)(A)

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21. CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR
REPRESENTATIVES - 1957

(S)

(4) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several [redacted] officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. [redacted] CIA was told that no tours would be given to the [redacted] because in the past a [redacted] Ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. (S)(u)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. (Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont "Representatives of [redacted] Intelligence Service" - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") (S)(u)

22. REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957

(S)(u)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. (S)(u)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council on Foreign Relations") (S)(u)

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23. [] (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A) In October, 1957, we received information from [] (S) indicating that [] (S) scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. We followed developments through [] (S) JFK(1)(A) and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with [] (S) We subsequently received information indicating that [] (S) a CIA employee, established contact with [] (S) for the purpose of developing information concerning the work of [] (S) scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by [] (S) possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation. (Re: [] (S) - 105-63094) (S) JFK(1)(A)

24. [] (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A) By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, [] (S) a Romanian alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. (Re: [] (S) - 105-62486) (S) JFK(1)(A)

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

JFK(1)(A) On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with [] (S) an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. [] (S) gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a Miss [] (S) who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that Miss [] (S) denied that she had made such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25, 1958, "Unknown Subject; [] (S) JFK(1)(A)

26. [] (S) JFK(1)(A)

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: [] (S) - 105-68013) (S) JFK(1)(A)

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27. [REDACTED] (S) JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

We received information in May, 1958, that [REDACTED] (S) a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia National Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investigation being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

(S) [REDACTED] furnished a signed statement indicating that he personally had no knowledge of the existence of the above information in the National Guard records. (S)

(JFK(1)(B)) (Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17, 1958, "Alleged Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI")

28. CORNEL MUNTIU

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests. (Re: Cornel Muntiu - 105-58749)

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, [Tokyo,] (S) furnished information volunteered to him by [Colonel James Riley] (S) of G-2. (S) (S) [Riley] was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies. He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

(Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, [Tokyo,] "Relations with CIA") (S)

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30. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (S)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the West German Intelligence Service. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with Gehlen. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any Chinese alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment of Chinese Aliens in the United States for Overseas Intelligence Operations")

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) In his communication [redacted] (S) belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.")

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(S)

33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES

(S)(U)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all employees of the [REDACTED] Government and assigned to the United States. [REDACTED] had been developed as a source of information by CIA in [REDACTED] Derachman came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. [REDACTED] had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of [REDACTED] we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (Re: [REDACTED] Activities - [100-254749])

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34. [REDACTED]

(S)

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A)

The subject, a former member of the Polish intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

JFK(1)(B)

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA May have opened a letter in [REDACTED] which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as [REDACTED]. The writer further indicated that he might be connected with the [REDACTED] Intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [REDACTED]. We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [REDACTED] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. [REDACTED] - 65-65192)

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35. [redacted] (S)

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By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a [Chinese] alien whom CIA (S) was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re [redacted] (S) Bureau file [134-5243]) (S)

JFK(1)(A)

36. [COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE] (S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for permission to play a recording of a telephone conversation (S) obtained by the Bureau to [redacted] (S) The (S) recording had been developed through our sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a conversation between [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) The conversation strongly indicated that [redacted] (S) was working closely with the Egyptians. (S) Subsequently, CIA developed information indicating that [redacted] (S) was a key figure in a revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) returned to [redacted] (S) and was imprisoned by [redacted] (S) based upon information made available through CIA. (S) [redacted] (S) denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the (S) Government. (S) [redacted] (S) told CIA that he was on the spot and that he needed proof of [redacted] (S) conspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the recording to be played to [redacted] (S) stressing that this was the only way [redacted] (S) could be convinced. (S) (U)

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing of the recording. (S) We maintained that if we granted such permission, our other coverage of a sensitive nature could be seriously imperiled. (S) (U)

On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in the Middle East. (S) Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously considering the termination of all of our technical surveillances (S) because we did not intend to be placed in such a position in the future. (S) (U)

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction. He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to (S) (U)

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anybody's head and he further indicated that he was deliberating whether or not the [recording] should be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the purpose of determining if the [recording] was to be used by CIA. The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." (S)(U)

The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan") (S)(U)

37.

JFK (U)(S)

[REDACTED] (S)(U)

JFK (U)(S)

[REDACTED]

JFK (U)(S)

38.

[REDACTED] (S) JFK (U)(A)

(S)(U) [1958] We expressed our displeasure to CIA in [September, 1958] because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a [Romanian] citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The [Romanian] indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a (S)(U)

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possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Re [redacted] Bureau file [redacted])

[105-64024] (S)

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(S) JFK(1)(A)

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN [redacted] (S) (U)

The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that [redacted] (S)

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[redacted] was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source of CIA. This information was given to the Legal Attache by (S) Colonel John B. Stanley, G2 Head in Japan. According to [Stanley] (S) CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H." (Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in [redacted] Philippines")

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40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

During the period October [20-25] 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. (S) Among the activities was a lecture given by [redacted] of CIA. Subsequent to the (S) briefing, General Millard Young, of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by [redacted]. He was particularly critical of (S)

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(S) [redacted]'s reluctance to furnish certain information, using the excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General (S) Young stated that the position taken by [redacted] was only an (S) excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA. (S)

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, "Joint Strategic Planning") (S) Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October [20-25] 1958") (S)

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

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show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of [CIA in Cuba.] This could be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States. (S) (U)

42. [redacted] (S)

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. (S) The individual involved was [redacted]

(S) [redacted] a well-known expert in the field of (S) (S) medical research as it applied to space flying. [redacted] was also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. In April, 1959, [redacted] was preparing to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to [redacted] concerning (S) his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us. (S) [redacted] Bureau file [105-69694] (S)

43. ALLEGED BELITTling OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959")

44. "TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock," which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

Lyman Kirkpatrick
is releasable

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JFK(1)(A) which led to an almos the Bureau and CIA.
The article was writte Paul McCarry who was connected
with the International Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, The article (S)
[redacted] was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference
to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly
indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA
took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau
for an extended period; and he related a story very critical
of the Director.

(S) We learned that the author had been in contact with
CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that Lyman
(S) Kirkpatrick, a CIA official, had read and approved the article
prior to its publication. As a result of this information,
(S) Kirkpatrick became persona non grata with the Bureau.

(S) The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles
(S) and Kirkpatrick concerning the matter. We took the position
that based upon the information made available CIA had promoted,
condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles denied
that this was so and then Kirkpatrick produced information indi-
cating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article
before it was published. The author had contacted Stanley
(S) Grogan, one of Kirkpatrick's subordinates, and had
discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised
the question of strained relations between the two agencies
and at that time Grogan reportedly told the author that rela-
tions were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless,
the final draft of the article included the derogatory infor-
mation and the facts available to us indicate that Kirkpatrick (S)
had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the
article before it was published. He did not do so. He told
us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison
relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue
and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course
of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not
immediately answer letters which had been sent to the Bureau
by Dulles and Kirkpatrick in connection with this particular
matter. It was also recommended and approved that we cut off
all contact with Kirkpatrick. (S)

By letter dated September 11, 1959, to Dulles, the
Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of
CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any con-
cern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed

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to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to Kirkpatrick and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, 'True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting Soviets. CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. By letter dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (Re [redacted] Bureau file [134-8493])

46. APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available.

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On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. (Bureau file 105-38958)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, [Ray Tanner, President] of Reicco Company, Caracas, Venezuela, [] informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with [] an official of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. [] was [] [] took exception to complimentary statements made by [Tanner] concerning the Director and the FBI. [] stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, ["Herschel F. Peak, Jr."]) (S) JFK(1)(B)

48. [ROBERT AMORY] CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

(S) In February, 1960, [Dr. Frank Barnett, Director of Research] for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by Robert Amory, a top CIA official. [Amory] allegedly advocated recognition of Red China. (S)

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of [Amory's] talk, and was satisfied that [Amory] had not made the statement attributed to him. (S)

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that [Amory] had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, ["Robert Amory"]) (S)

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly

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had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50. [REDACTED] (S) JFK (U) (A)

JFK (U) (A) We received information indicating that the subject, a [former Cuban] intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect [REDACTED] We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative [REDACTED] had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] (S)

51. [REDACTED] (S)

JFK (U) (B) Miss [REDACTED] (S) JFK (U) (B) a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of [REDACTED] Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that [REDACTED] had informed [REDACTED] that she was leaving her job. The [REDACTED] inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss [REDACTED]

JFK (U) (B) The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, [REDACTED])

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52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961, "SOLO") (S) (U)

53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, [REDACTED] - 1961 (S) (U)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, [REDACTED] received information indicating that the [Czech Embassy] in that city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [REDACTED] that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum L'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, "Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities") (S) (U) (JFK) (U) (U)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in December, 1961, [REDACTED] furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, [REDACTED] was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation. (S) (U) (JFK) (U) (U)

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On February 7, 1962, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with Edwards on February 26, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on [] over an extended period. (S) JFK(1)(8) Edwards explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27, 1962, "Unknown Subject; KGB Agent Known as []") (S)

56. [] (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(B) In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated [] as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau file [105-99947]) (S) JFK(1)(B)

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

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The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, "Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memorandum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58. [REDACTED] (S)

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962, [REDACTED])

59. [REDACTED] (S)

On April 23, 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting [REDACTED] national. We immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, [REDACTED]) (S)

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN MCCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received \$6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national. Interrogation of Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations With CIA")

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61. [YURI NOSENKO] (S)

The subject is a Soviet national who first made contact with CIA in 1962^(S) expressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in 1964^(S) and he is currently in the United States. He has been the source of considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in 1964^(S) CIA took a very strong position indicating that [Nosenko] was a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, [Nosenko]^(S) although controversial, continues to furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned.

If it is finally concluded that [Nosenko]^(S) is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of the subject over a period of years. [Yuri Nosenko, Bureau file 65-68530]^(S)

62. [REDACTED] (S)

On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets [in Mexico.] The individual in this case was serving as an [REDACTED] in Texas in 1964^(S) and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the [REDACTED]^(S) could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the [REDACTED] prior to his^(S) assignment in the United States, but CIA, nevertheless, had an obligation to give us proper notification. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, "[Jose Rafael Suarez-Arcos"])^(S)

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY [REDACTED] - 1965^{(S)(U)} JFK (U) (B)

JFK (U) (B) We received information in June, 1965, that certain [REDACTED] were representing themselves as [REDACTED]^{(S)(U)}

[REDACTED] We ascertained that this activity was being performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the [REDACTED]^{(S)(U)}

We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients

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of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, June 21, 1965, "Central Intelligence Agency - Operations [redacted] (S) (u)

64. [redacted] (S) JFK (1) (A)

JFK (1) (A) (S) (u)
In August, 1965, both the Bureau and CIA had an interest in assessing the potential utilization of the services of [redacted] a Haitian exile residing in the United States. We were interested in [redacted] because he potentially could furnish information concerning [Haitian] exiles in this country and the Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations. We informed CIA that [redacted] would not be made available to the Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position because of the potentially high value of [redacted] in the proposed CIA operation. While we were negotiating with CIA, we determined that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agency who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting [redacted] because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the past. We did not accept this explanation. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 2, 1965, [redacted] (S) JFK (1) (A)

65. INSECURE HANDLING OF TOPHAT INFORMATION (S) (u) JFK (1) (B)

(S) (u) By letter dated December 2, 1965, CIA informed us that one of its representatives had notified the U.S. Ambassador in [Burma] that the newly designated [Soviet] Military Attache in [Rangoon] had cooperated with the FBI prior to leaving the United States in 1962 and that he had remained in contact following his return to Moscow. This all pertained to a sensitive Bureau source who had been transferred by the [Soviet] Government from [Moscow] to the [Soviet] Embassy in [Burma]. By letter dated December 3, 1965, we made a strong protest to CIA charging that Agency with violating an understanding relative to the Tophat operation. Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA, telephonically contacted the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged that his man had been out of line, but did express concern that the Bureau's displeasure had been placed in writing. The Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that no further operational activity be taken with regard to Tophat until we determined what CIA planned to do concerning the matter. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 2, 1965, "Tophat") (S) (u) JFK (1) (B)

66. [redacted] (S) JFK (1) (A)

(S) (u) In March, 1966, CIA requested coverage on a visiting official of the [redacted] Government because of information developed by the Agency indicating that the [redacted] was working for the KGB. (S) (u) JFK (1) (A)

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Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, [REDACTED] (S) JFK(L)A)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO
SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, [REDACTED] had submitted (S) a name check request to the Bureau concerning one [REDACTED] (S) who was the subject of the material in question. At that time [REDACTED] (S) had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named [REDACTED] (S) JFK(L)A

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning [REDACTED] to Senator Robert C. Byrd") (S) (u)

68. ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT (S) (u)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a [REDACTED] (S) connected with [REDACTED] Corporation in Newark, New Jersey (S) (u). We were utilizing the [REDACTED] as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets. CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of [REDACTED] (S) Our Newark [REDACTED] (S) (u) Office received information indicating that a CIA officer, without authorization, compromised our relationship with the [REDACTED] (S) by discussing the matter with the president of the [REDACTED] (S) (u) firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967, ["NK 2264-S, IS - R"]) (S)

69. [REDACTED] (S) JFK(L)A

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

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for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to respond to the communication received from Cuba. We took the position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile, the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to make its own assessment. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, July 20, 1967, [redacted] IS - Cuba") (S) (JFK)(1)(4) (S)

**70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION
DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL"**

On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights of Government employees. We had been following developments relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security Agency. These amendments were suggested by CIA without prior consultation with the Bureau. The Director made the notation, "This presumptuous action of Helms' is astounding." (M. A. Jones to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy")

71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in following our leads. It should be noted that CIA, organizationally, has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau. We continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses: hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries; limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police, and security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

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targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign countries. Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the point, it is believed that in many instances it has not produced satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on the part of CIA employees. They do receive some training in this regard, but the impression is left that such training could be much more extensive. The Bureau's Liaison Agent has lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits. CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities. Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA policy relating to its dissemination of information [at a local level in our embassies.] This policy allegedly has applied to all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has maintained that unless the information it develops or receives is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an example, if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S. criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate to the Legal Attache. However, if the information falls within the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities, the Agency has stated that under its system the information is considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been received from other countries, and then disseminated to interested customers. We have not raised an issue, but dissemination regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further orient him in his dealings with foreign officials. There have been exceptions where the CIA [chief in an area, on his own initiative.] has given such information to our Legal Attache. After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position to communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This helps, but it would be much more convenient for the Legal Attache to receive it [at the local level.]

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There are situations where CIA offices abroad receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad simply has ramifications in this country. In these instances, CIA has followed a definite pattern over the years of not furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here again, CIA has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised an issue. We could be claiming that the Legal Attache could be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

For several years there existed a coordinating mechanism in [] headed by CIA. This was a committee headed by the Agency and composed of representatives of other U.S. agencies. The committee reviewed espionage and counter-espionage developments in [] which had a bearing on U.S. interests. If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to establish an agreed-to operating agreement. Quite often various responsibilities were divided among the different agencies. It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been interested in becoming a part of such a committee. If we did, we could end up with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us. (u)

74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS. William Donovan, who was the head of OSS, has been referred to as the "Father of CIA."

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters. There was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike for the Bureau. The loose administration of OSS, its employment of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets, and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed serious problems to the Bureau. At one point OSS was actually giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

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NKVD. Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau rightfully cannot forget the troubles with OSS. At the same time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the role played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations in 1947. In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a large number of sources and informants. There have been many ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar with the file destruction operation, and who later became connected with CIA. It is possible that the Agency could argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S. interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired coverage in Latin America.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 19601-11-01 #mde/b
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,5ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(s) Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to [REDACTED] by Legal Attache (Legat), PLACE in 1960 to explore arrangements for liaison with appropriate [REDACTED] authorities. It is given as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with them in line with National Security Council Directives.

NAME reportedly raised questions, indicating FBI should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously handled all relations with [REDACTED] authorities. (s) Papich says CIA Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory to all concerned was eventually worked out. Papich also says that in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in Denmark but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark, Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, PLACE, to broaden liaison contacts in Scandinavian countries and told LEGAT, PLACE to make exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in [REDACTED] (s) for the same purpose. Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55 that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks for the [REDACTED] (s) only when received through formal State channels, we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with the [REDACTED] (s) regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State approved. State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in [REDACTED] (s) on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention, but it apparently did not get to NAME prior to Legat's trip to [REDACTED] (s)

On 1/4/60 Legat, PLACE, called the [REDACTED] (s) from PLACE and arranged to call on them on 1/7/60. The [REDACTED] (s) reported the call to [REDACTED] (s) who told STATE DEPARTMENT

NAME On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60 from NAME in which he said he was disturbed about the manner in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While offering to assist the Bureau, NAME spoke of the long standing contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with [REDACTED] (s) and suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if permanent Bureau liaison with [REDACTED] (s) was planned.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (s) JFK (C) (B)

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]

JFK(1)(3) [REDACTED] - 1960

On 1/7/60, Legat met with NAME prior to visiting [REDACTED]. He explained that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with [REDACTED] concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal security matters. He said he would not be operational and that the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference with the existing CIA arrangement. (S) While NAME expressed misgivings that the [REDACTED] might be confused, no request was made to refrain from contacting [REDACTED]. The CIA representative said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply. Legat later briefed NAME on the results of his visit to [REDACTED] who were friendly but deferred a final commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked NAME for his offer to assist, and said Bureau interests in Scandinavian countries and [REDACTED] were under discussion with Allen Dulles. NAME was also assured our proposed contacts with the [REDACTED] were purely liaison in nature; that while we would keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in coordinating with CIA matters taken up with [REDACTED]. (S) That Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10, however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and NAME the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and [REDACTED] exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark. When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply with the Directive for coordination of U.S. liaison activities abroad, NAME immediately stated there were no such instances. In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give all possible assistance. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal letter to NAME which resulted in a joint FBI-CIA meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI [REDACTED] liaison was agreed upon).

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]

SECRET

JFK(1)(B)

(S) - 1960

On memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* of 1/14/60, concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and *NAME*. Director noted : "1. Well handled by Papich. 2. All of the turmoil developing in this situation could have been avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *PD*1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Conrad

DATE: April 14, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY *5668 SLD/GCL*
ON *4-2-98 (JFK)*SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection activities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representatives to further explore these matters.

On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself met briefly with Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, and Mr. W. Scott Miler of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA Director Helms will be closely following the outcome of these discussions and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this area.

Mr. Angleton indicated that CIA would like to direct initial attention to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electronic surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists in the communist bloc field hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information. The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reiterated with emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of the lack of support for such operations.

REC 44
Angleton noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic coverage of two Indian nationals who were suspected KGB agents in the Fall of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they take this matter up with the

WCS:mea
(4)Classified by *12*
Exempt from GDS, Category *2+3* CONTINUED - OVER
Date of Declassification Indefinite
4-11-75

57 APR 24 1970

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE
ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.#moe/6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG
ON 1-01-01

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's refusal of a 1958 CIA request for *NAME* to lecture on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by *NAME*, CIA requested *NAME* to address a selected group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S. CIA suggested dates of 12/9, 10, or 11/58. The Director by routing slip attached to *NAME* letter commented, "It seems strange that CIA should seek this when its top representative in considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI. But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* dated 10/1/58 made reference to CIA's request and the Director's comments. It recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served by giving this lecture, not because of the information which could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because it would give *NAME* an opportunity to raise a number of questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture and discussion rather than the converse. *NAME* recommended that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting, "We cannot make *NAME* available to this outfit."

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

#MDA 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/7TG
ON 1-11-01SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by

NAME regarding recruitment of four CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE *NAME* AND

IDENTIFYING DATA *NAME* alleged that the KGB had penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name *NAME*. In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided *NAME* with information regarding many individuals who had worked for CIA in Germany.

NAME identified two individuals at various times as *NAME* and in each instance investigation "washed out" the identification. *NAME* finally identified *NAME* as one *NAME* a former employee of CIA. During the course of extensive document reviews *NAME* became acquainted with background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at the time *NAME* did. *NAME* identified four present employees of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-scale investigation of its four employees based solely on *NAME*'s allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of allegations by *NAME*. With regard to any investigation in the United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be made following completion of the investigation of *NAME* and interviews of *NAME*. Based upon the investigation of *NAME* and the interviews of *NAME*, CIA was informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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CONTINUED - OVER

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIADECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
ON 216198 (JFK)

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 out of the 38 items. The recommended action in each of these cases would logically close the matter. In one memorandum the 37th item, ~~which~~, it is recommended that a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Classified by C283Exempt from GDS Category 2 & 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Sullivan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA JPK (1) (A)

Item number one in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of [REDACTED] JPK (1) (A)

BACKGROUND OF CASE JPK (1) (A) [REDACTED] a Hollywood motion picture producer, was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935. From 1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI. This was an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which Morros traveled behind the Iron Curtain for meetings with his Soviet principals.

Information obtained by [REDACTED] JPK (1) (A) from his Soviet contacts was disseminated to interested agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States.

PROBLEM WITH CIA JPK (1) (A) On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated information received from [REDACTED] to heads of the various intelligence agencies, including CIA. By letter of March 27, 1954, Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA, criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as "fabrication or the product of a paper mill," which conclusion Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in the past from apparently the same source. By letter of April 5, 1954, the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles, then Director of CIA, advised Liaison Agent Papich that he had been looking into the matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

62-80750

1 - 100-352385 [REDACTED] JPK (1) (A)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. L. Whitson

LW:as (7)

SECRET

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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MDR/6 1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/STG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continue to send reports from the source [] which relate [] (A) to matters of foreign intelligence. By letter of April 29, 1954, the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by disseminating to CIA information received from the source in the future.

JFK (A) (A) Nevertheless, memorandum Branigan to Belmont dated April 28, 1954, pointed out that when and if the Bureau receives information in the [] in the future of a type required by National Security Council Directive to be furnished to CIA, it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it. This restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

JFK (A) (A) Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information from [] during October and December, 1954, and appropriate dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

JFK (A) (A) As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if Department attorneys could interview a Soviet intelligence defector then in custody of CIA named [] (A) Accordingly, the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles and on 1/8/57 he and James Angleton of his staff were generally briefed on the [] and the contemplated prosecution. They were furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in France, [] CIA was requested to search the names of individuals involved in the case and was asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have information of pertinence concerning the [] (A)

On March 4, 1957, Mr. James Angleton informed the liaison agent of resentment on the part of CIA employees and officials based upon the following:

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

SECRET

(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the case was publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence agencies to play a dominant role in the European investigation.

(4) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA The Bureau took the position that any necessary investigation looking toward prosecution in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative agency of that country. In those countries where the Bureau did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would be channelled through CIA. Because the [] were in France, the interrogation of the [] was handled by request from the Legal Attache to the French. JFK() (A)

JFK() (A) [] during World War II had been with the Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA personnel. Prior to decision on prosecution we did not disseminate information regarding the [] because we feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would endanger the life of our source. This was particularly true in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had been given to CIA over two weeks before the arrests of the subjects in the United States. Leads were not given earlier because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned, it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over the French investigation after the French had the information. There was a distinct difference in this case between intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive action. JFK() (A)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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Recently the British MI-5 ^(S) representative in Washington has made some inquiries relating to JFK(1)(A) indicating the British may now believe was either JFK(1)(A) known to the Soviets as our agent or was under their control. It is not known if the British have discussed this matter with CIA. ^(S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials: J, WCL, k, and a signature]

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/9/70

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Birmingham

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Sullivan _____
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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN [REDACTED]

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG
ON 1-10-01

Item number two in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 states that during the 1950's, CIA periodically complained that the operations of our office in [REDACTED] and specifically those involving the operating of informants and the penetration of the Communist Party of [REDACTED] violated the understanding that this office was to act only as a liaison post. He also states CIA has informally raised questions on our running informants in [REDACTED] and still being able to comply with Directives requiring coordination of overseas clandestine counterintelligence operations under CIA. He states comments by CIA officials along above lines have been casual and informal and indicate the situation has been a potential issue rather than an actual conflict or disagreement. The essence of his remarks in this item is that the Bureau is vulnerable to criticism by CIA because of our operations in [REDACTED]

Review of our files fail to reveal receipt of any formal protest by CIA concerning these matters. We have been operating [alongside CIA] in [REDACTED] since 1947. In 1951, Inspector V. P. Keay, after visiting [REDACTED] reported that CIA was not adequately investigating matters in [REDACTED] affecting the internal security of the U.S. and recommended that after properly advising CIA, Legat, [REDACTED] be instructed to undertake such investigations. The Executive Conference considered this problem on 4/19/51 and decided we should extend our coverage in [REDACTED] but should not reach any understanding with CIA regarding these increased activities. It was decided, however, to advise CIA in writing of this problem in [REDACTED] in order to fix responsibility on that Agency and such a letter was sent on 5/1/51. A copy is attached.

Enclosure

RAB:bsf/wmk Wmk
(5)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

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JFK(1)(3) In 10/51, almost simultaneously, our Legats in [redacted] reported instances of CIA [redacted] officials openly challenging our operations, generally on the grounds that we were violating CIA overseas jurisdiction. Inspectors V. P. Keay and DeLoach personally and forcefully brought these instances to the attention of General Walter B. Smith, Director of CIA, in a heated exchange on 10/24/51. Out of this meeting developed a luncheon on 11/7/51 attended by the Director, Bureau officials and General Smith, who was accompanied by several officers of his Agency. According to a memorandum, D. M. Ladd to the Director, dated 11/7/51, CIA recognized our presence abroad and both agencies pledged cooperation and coordination through greater liaison so as to prevent conflict and competition in these closely associated operations. During the ensuing 19 years, the Bureau continued to operate in [redacted] and on occasions moderately expanded its activities in order to meet its needs. During this lengthy period, there were no serious problems with CIA, with reference to our [redacted] office.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large 'P' with a slash, 'WES' with a checkmark, 'RAB', and 'HPR']

~~SECRET~~

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**CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER**

Date: May 1, 1951

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Major General W. G. Wyman
(Office of Special Operations) JFK (1)(3)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES OF
AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO

JFK
(1)(3)

Reference is made to recent discussions between representatives of the Office of (Special Operations-CIA) and Special Agent C. D. DeLoach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the captioned matter. It is understood that your representatives pointed out that the (Mexico City station of CIA) with its limited personnel, attempted to follow movements of American Communists as well as possible, however, it would be impossible to guarantee an advance report in each individual case when the Communist member in question is about to return to the United States.

You will recall that the following suggestions were offered by your representatives in connection with this matter:

- (1) Utilization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List.
- (2) Advice from FBI as to whether the Mexican Police could be used in handling cases.
- (3) Advice from the FBI to CIA indicating which cases are most important so that those cases could be given preferred attention.

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Gandy _____

It was indicated by the CIA representatives that possibly the adoption of these suggestions would in some manner assist them in handling Communist cases in Mexico.
cc: Legal Attache, Mexico City, Mexico
cc: Foreign Service Desk (detached)

**SECRET
AIR COURIER**

SECRET

EDD:pjb

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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The FBI, of course, fully realizes the difficult problems involved in surveilling American Communists in foreign countries. At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that in the present emergency each individual Communist investigation, routine or otherwise, should receive proper attention when the subject concerned travels to foreign countries. As you no doubt realize, the Communist Party, U.S.A., represents a potential force as far as espionage and sabotage operations are concerned. Therefore, even minor members of the Party could become involved in delicate operations. As pointed out in the discussions between Mr. DeLoach and representatives of your agency, the travels of Communists from the United States to Mexico are very likely to become much greater, thereby proposing a more serious problem than is now faced.

The FBI has for some time utilized the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List as a source of information concerning the travel of Communists. Although representing an excellent method of ascertaining this type of information, at the same time the FBI is not afforded any advance warning from this source as to the return of the Communist Party member to the United States. Therefore, the investigation of that member becomes delinquent in view of the fact active investigation is not initiated at the time of his re-entry. It is, therefore, believed that this particular source of information would not be satisfactory in lieu of information from your agency which would notify us in advance of the return to the United States of the Communist Party member in question.

With respect to the FBI advising your agency when the services of the Mexican Police may be utilized in individual cases, this Bureau will be most happy to advise you of those "sensitive cases" which are considered too delicate for referral to the Mexican Police, or foreign factions. With regard to the remainder of investigations, however, we shall defer to your judgment as to whether you wish to utilize the Mexican Police or not. The jurisdiction of the Office of Special Operations in foreign intelligence matters allows for a more over-all knowledge of the Mexican Police than this Bureau presently possesses. Therefore, we suggest that you weigh the facts in each individual case and consider whether the Mexican Police should be called in or not.

Concerning the ranking importance of cases, it is the opinion of this Bureau that the facts provided your agency in each individual case will determine the methods of investigation you wish to apply. It is not, therefore, considered necessary for the FBI to point out the importance of each matter referred to your agency.

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As suggested by your representatives, we will be most happy to hold a conference with your Mexican supervisory personnel at any time concerning discussions of investigations in Mexico. It is additionally suggested, however, that you advise your field representatives in Mexico City to contact the FBI's Legal Attache regarding coordination of the same matters in that locality.

- 3 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
THE ABEL CASE

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1970

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento
1 - Liaison

Tolson _____
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Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the risk and responsibility of transporting Hayhanen from Paris to the U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become involved in this transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the Bureau dropped Hayhanen, an alcoholic, because he became a problem and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making Hayhanen mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also, CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau; further, the Bureau never thanked CIA for its cooperation nor did it see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of Reino Hayhanen, Abel's assistant.

On the night of May 7, 1957, James Angleton of CIA advised Mr. Belmont that Hayhanen had walked into the American Embassy in Paris about three days ago and was referred to CIA. He claimed he was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details to back up his story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and got "cold feet" in Paris and wanted to cooperate with American officials. He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to question his mental stability. It was the opinion of Mr. Belmont that no steps should be taken to return Hayhanen to the U. S. until the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual status. Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

62-80750

APL:tdp (7) *tdp*

1 - 65-64538

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#MDR/16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STB
ON 1-10-01

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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based on Hayhanen's disclosures and was not able to prove or disprove his story. On May 8, 1957, CIA was informed of the facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it intended to take regarding Hayhanen's return to the U.S. On May 9, 1957, Angleton advised of a report received from CIA, Paris, revealing that Hayhanen had suffered almost a complete mental breakdown and that in view of his condition, arrangements were made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the U.S. in the company of a CIA agent. On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until May 15, 1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities arranged for his confinement in the U.S. Marine Hospital, Staten Island, for psychiatric examination through the U.S. Public Health Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously conferred with an INS official who had stated that if Hayhanen's condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S., an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health Service).

Hayhanen and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel by New York Agents and were under Bureau control from May 15, 1957, until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence in Peekskill, New York, at their request. All expenses for their maintenance were paid by the Bureau. During this period Hayhanen and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking and irrational behavior.

On June 13, 1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York. Efforts by Bureau Agents and the Department to have Hayhanen testify against Abel in a criminal prosecution were unavailing. With the Department's concurrence, we arranged for INS authorities to arrest Abel on June 21, 1957, on an alien warrant. After Abel's arrest, the Department continued to raise questions concerning Hayhanen's willingness to testify in an espionage prosecution against Abel and requested the Bureau to press Hayhanen in that regard. We took the position that any efforts to induce Hayhanen to testify should be made by the Department, as we realized that Hayhanen would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining in this country and financial assistance, and the Department was so advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau would no longer pay Hayhanen's subsistence and that other arrangements would have to be made. In an effort to solicit Hayhanen's cooperation, the Department conferred with Allen Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor the entry of Hayhanen into the U.S. under the authority granted the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness not only to sponsor Hayhanen but also to assist in his rehabilitation.

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-30750

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in the U.S., such as assisting him in obtaining a job and furnishing financial assistance for an extended period of time. On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed in touch with Hayhanen by New York Agents for this purpose. Our Agents also arranged for FBI's access to Hayhanen whenever necessary. Subsequently, Hayhanen agreed to testify and appeared before a Federal grand jury on August 5 and August 6, 1957.

As indicated above, we located Abel on June 13 and he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21, 1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for Hayhanen's rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on behalf of Hayhanen, it was not at the request of the Bureau but at the request of the Department.

Regarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked it for its cooperation, it is pointed out that a letter from the Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957, shortly after Abel's conviction. It pointed out the excellent cooperation of James Angleton and his staff with the Bureau since the inception of this case and that the Director wished to express his personal appreciation to Angleton and his staff for their valuable assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None, we do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/JIG
ON 1-10-01

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding William P. Bundy emanated from a Bureau report. Bundy was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that the Bureau leaked the information to Senator Joseph McCarthy who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53 Dulles inquired of Papich as to where McCarthy could get information such as that released concerning Bundy. Papich immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such information to Senator McCarthy he was definitely wrong and off base. Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had also been made available to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the McCarthy releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning Bundy which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any information concerning Bundy to Senator McCarthy or the news media. There was considerable publicity concerning Bundy at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that Bundy was the son-in-law of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

TJS:mea
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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

~~SECRET~~

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the matter by Republican Senator McCarthy. It is also noted that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil Service Commission, National Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Army and the Attorney General. A conflict broke out between CIA and Senator Joseph McCarthy after McCarthy publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled out Bundy's contribution to the Alger Hiss fund. The files indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DJR

✓ *WEL* *g* *st*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Harrell

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#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/116
ON 1-10-01

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone, who in the late 1920's headed the U. S. Communist Party, thereafter became completely disillusioned with the Party, and subsequently occupied an executive position with American Federation of Labor.

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been furnished FBI by Spencer Miller, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Labor. Miller made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the Miller data was not a complete story.

BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on 12/4/53 Miller had informed CIA representatives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward Jay Lovestone's being a communist and active agent, and that Lovestone might shortly be exposed by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great Soviet ring after Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. When interviewed by Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that Lovestone was engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as Lovestone was concerned. He acknowledged everything he had come to him secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that Dr. Milton Eisenhower had told him of a conversation he had with Spencer Miller. The Attorney General said he told Dr. Eisenhower he would have Miller interviewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous interview with Miller and advised we would have him interviewed again to

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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secure any additional data he might have. Miller was reinterviewed the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/19/54, Governor Sherman Adams called the Director from White House about the Miller situation. The Director advised Governor Adams that he had personally talked to Miller for two hours the previous day and had concluded that Miller was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with Miller, 2/18/54, he referred Miller to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 20-page memorandum, copies of which were furnished Attorney General, Governor Adams, CIA and State Department.

We interviewed Miller at the specific instructions of the Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not only proper but required under the circumstances. CIA and State Department received results since allegations concerned officials and operations of those agencies. Miller furnished names of persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed them and disseminated results. Mr. James Angleton of CIA commented on 3/13/54 that when the Miller information was first received at that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose of "hurting" CIA. Angleton said results of interviews and investigation conducted by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was living by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing facts and reporting information in an impartial manner. He said on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the Bureau was following the Lovestone case in conformity with its well established reputation of getting all the facts. In view of this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its handling of the Miller matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Ryan

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS
FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-16-01 BY SP7 ALM/216

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no contact with Bureau officials. CIA felt contact with Bureau officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials they were left with suspicions there was friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," (Bureau file 94-2-32781) recommended for Director's approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to foreign police officials and security officials would continue to be of a restricted nature and the visitors will only view facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared to the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted, "I thoroughly agree. I am not too keen anyway about such tours. We were 'burned' in the Johns matter." The Director noted in regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

Doctor Otto John was an official of the West German security service who was closely associated with CIA and who was alleged to have defected to the East Germans.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA sponsorship.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

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None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DR:sfw/jls (6)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

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1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

(S) CIA - [] INTERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

(S) Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses (S) CIA - [] interests in Soviet Espionage Activity. SA Papich notes that in 1956 the [] wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached (S) CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. When CIA approached us, we told them to have the [] submit the request through diplomatic channels and we subsequently told CIA we would not handle the interviews for the []. Although CIA accepted this, they felt it hurt efforts to gather Soviet espionage information in Europe. Our position was based on failure of the [] to deal honestly with us in the case of Joseph Petersen, who was involved in collecting intelligence information at the National Security Agency for a [] official.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

(S) This question first arose when a [] official approached our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance in interviewing Mrs. Antonina Thomas in the U. S. and to have a [] representative present during the interview. Mrs. Thomas is the widow of General Walter Krivitsky, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior to his defection in 1937. (S) The [] representative said CIA had interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactory. He was told to submit his request through diplomatic channels. In June, a CIA representative advised SA Papich they were receiving pressure from the [] to have a [] representative bring all the material on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing Mrs. Thomas and two others in the U. S., but not to participate in the interview. (S) In accordance with instructions, SA Papich told CIA to have the [] submit their request through diplomatic channels and to include all information in writing, and that the Bureau would not deal personally with a [] representative. By memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that James Angleton (S) of CIA told SA Papich he was of the very strong opinion that the Bureau's position made good sense, but other CIA officials felt the [] should be helped in every possible way. (S)

62-80750

JPL:tdp (6)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2A/M/216
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then Assistant Director A. H. Belmont and SA Papich met with Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, and James Angleton of CIA. Helms asked if the Bureau would talk to a representative of the [] if he came over and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information and leads furnished by the [] (s)

Belmont pointed out the Bureau's position was very simple in that the [] had been caught short in the Petersen case when their representatives had been obtaining highly classified information from a friendly government and, before the FBI even requested to interview the [] representatives involved, the [] Ambassador notified State Department (s) that if [] representatives were to be interviewed, it should be done by State Department and not by the FBI. Helms was told that in view of this, the Bureau notified State Department that any requests for information from the [] to be handled by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department. (s) Mr. Belmont said that this was a situation created by the [] and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position and we would not talk to a [] representative and did not desire to receive any leads in the Krivitsky case through [CIA]. (s) (s) Mr. Helms advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with the []. He said he understood the Bureau's position, which in essence was that the [] had made their bed and could now lie in it. (s)

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that [CIA] will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

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SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses relations between Bureau and CIA with Grombach, head of private intelligence network (O'Brien was Grombach's aide who had liaison with Bureau).

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving information from Grombach which was also of interest to CIA; and that while it is possible Grombach had given same data to CIA, we do not know.

JFK(1)(B) Analysis: Grombach was financed by CIA during early 1950s (e.g., CIA budgeted \$650,000 for Grombach in 1952). (62-77306-60) There is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information from Grombach. We do know some information was given by Grombach to CIA and Bureau jointly. O'Brien, for example, told us of conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and Grombach when it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by Grombach, provided CIA was advised by Grombach of what was given. (62-77306-23) Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving from Grombach and asked for our views regarding method to be employed in channeling information from Grombach to Bureau. Significantly, under procedure then, Grombach directed communications to CIA with copies to Bureau. CIA was told that as it appeared Grombach was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recommending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle problem. (62-77306-25)

JFK(1)(B) In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and Grombach over channeling of information and Bureau made every effort to stay out of dispute. In late 1952, for example, Helms inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed. He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how received. (62-77306-27) Our position of not becoming involved in Grombach-CIA dispute reiterated on other occasions. (62-77306-36, 69, 81; 65-58725-56)

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Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

~~SECRET~~

On the other hand, there were instances where we received information from Grombach which was of either an administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did not inform CIA. These instances covered period both prior and subsequent to the contractual relationship between CIA and Grombach which was from 4/51 to 7/54 (62-77306, unrecorded memo 11/29/55, Belmont to Boardman re Grombach). For example, Grombach wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd which contained information of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled notation: "This info. not to be given to CIA. per DML--OHB" (62-77306-7). Memorandum 10/11/50 from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd contains information from O'Brien concerning Grombach's intentions to plant microphones in Finland to cover meetings attended by Russian high staff. It was observed in the memorandum that at that time O'Brien and Grombach had no relations with CIA and that Grombach's intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA. No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau (65-58725-10).

O'Brien furnished Bureau a memorandum dated 6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which informed of the termination of contract between Grombach and CIA. In the memorandum it is pointed out that Grombach will continue to receive raw material from the field and that while he will no longer be in a position to translate, evaluate, publish, etc., Grombach desires to forward such material to Bureau as Grombach would not trust any other agency. The memorandum also states that Grombach has continued the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would be interested in even though Grombach received a written order specifically directing him to not give Bureau anything. (62-77306-70).

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Dix

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

Handwritten: #mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-8 ALM/JTG
ON 1-10-01

Item number nine in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished the names of subversives within CIA to Senator McCarthy. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisc) was Chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee.

General Mark Clark headed the Task Force which surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA alleged that the McCarthy Committee was attempting to develop information regarding CIA operations. According to the Washington Star, 10/1/54, McCarthy said CIA was "one of the worst situations we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned." He said he would give his data relative to this matter to Clark's Task Force. According to the Washington Star, 1/15/55, McCarthy said he had given Clark information relative to alleged communist infiltration of CIA. As of 1/17/55, CIA had not received from Clark the names of those considered security risks but CIA believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and believed that it was in good shape.

On 1/21/55, the Task Force requested name checks on security risks named by McCarthy. Memoranda containing the results of those checks were given to the Task Force on 2/8/55. On 5/13/55, the Bureau received a letter from Clark asking for investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA was aware of the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them. Clark was later advised that the investigations would entail interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

WPD:bsf *bsf*
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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished McCarthy the names of subversives at CIA has not been recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 PLM/116*
ON *11/10/01*

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches (Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or requesting the Agency to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence," thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our Legats to have leads covered in foreign countries. The Manual of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and dissemination of intelligence information. CIA does not have, among other things, responsibility for "internal security functions."

In the absence of unusual situations, we forward investigative leads pertaining to our cases in countries where we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache concerned. Through his contacts the Legat arranges for the necessary investigation and submits the desired information according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates this activity on a local level.

It is more desirable to have our representatives request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage, and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/7/70

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)
[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (u)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
GMB 5/1/94 (SP8 MAC/GCL-6/14-362)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source [redacted] and the CPC should be turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [redacted] Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. The entire operation was later turned over to CIA. (u)

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [redacted] regarding Havana informants. [redacted] the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [redacted] concerning the CPC [redacted] and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [redacted] For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage. [redacted] We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [redacted] through informant sources [redacted] to obtain needed information regarding security matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound. (u)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HCF:bsf/mst

(5) mst.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

SECRET

#MDR16 1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/316
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

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Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio) in 1959 concerning strained relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat) William G. Friedemann (now retired) and former U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs. According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador that Legat had disseminated information from a source who was either a fabricator or a provocator.

Friedemann was assigned as Legat in Rio on October 25, 1958, and was transferred as Assistant Legat in Havana on August 22, 1959, after Bureau concluded that he lacked sufficient administrative experience to function as Legat, Rio. In early 1959 he began to receive information from Antonio Martinez De Santos, an employee of the Political Section, Federal District Police. Martinez furnished derogatory information concerning one General Lott of the Brazilian Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in 1960, indicating that Lott had questionable contacts with the Czech Embassy in Brazil. This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to a source who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his reliability. CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning Lott caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist deception operation. CIA requested that we identify our source but we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated October 1, 1959, the new Legat, Rio, recommended that Martinez be discontinued as a potential source based on his admissions to Legat that he had no sources in Czech Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. L.F. Schwartz

LFS:bcw (5)

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

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information Martinez had furnished was of such a nature that it could have come from public sources, the political police or could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts. Legat also concluded that Martinez could not have been a provocator used by Czechs to pass deceptive information. Contacts with Martinez were discontinued in November, 1959. (S)

In our dissemination of information from Martinez to CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the source were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although subsequent events established that it was likely that CIA was correct in speculating that the information was fabricated, there was no indication that the source was a Czech-controlled provocator. (S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~to~~ ✓ ~~WEL~~ Jc

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/6/70

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. H. W. Little
1 - Mr. J. E. Gauzens

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ITG
ON 1-10-01

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957, concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the

JFK (U) (B) [] These informants were operated inside []
The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were already being handled by the Bureau.

BACKGROUND:

The Director initiated BOCOV in 1948 to fill a void in the lack of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U.S.-Mexican border on the part of CIA and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The program, which at first involved 3 and subsequently 5 of our border offices including Phoenix, was designed to detect and neutralize anti-U.S. activities by subversives in that zone.

JFK (U) (B)
In June, 1956, CIA assigned a representative to the

PROBLEM:

JFK (U) (B) By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources in [] and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated 6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established to continue operating already established valuable sources even though CIA also began using them; however, the information we

62-80750

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1 - 100-356015 (BOCOV)
1 - 100-356015 Sub 38 (BOCOV-PX)

JEG:HWL:d1m
(9)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV)

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received from these sources was to be broken down and paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far as possible the fact that these individuals were assisting us. The Director approved these safeguards which were successfully placed into effect by Phoenix.

A review of our files since June 14, 1957, fails to reveal that this problem has been raised subsequently by [redacted] area. In addition, the

JFK(1)(B)
JFK(1)(B)
CIA representative was transferred from [redacted] on 7/6/59. He was not replaced by CIA and the border territory he had covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis out of [redacted]. Furthermore, the participation of the Phoenix Office in BOCOV was discontinued with the Director's approval by letter dated 12/10/69.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and marks: "D", "7/6/59", "W", "A", "JTB"]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. L. H. Martin

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

JFK(1)(A) **CARPORT** (S)

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/278
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

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Item number 14 in material submitted to Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses **CARPORT** case. **CARPORT** is code name for case on our double agent, [redacted] who was recruited by Soviets while on business trip to Moscow in 1954. Until discontinued in 1964 he delivered extensive material, cleared by United States Evaluation Board, to the Soviets in United States and Europe. (S)

Mr. Papich's memorandum states case was being highlighted since we cannot exclude possibility Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has evidence to demonstrate we were operational in **Europe** and did not co-ordinate with CIA. The fact is CIA did know [redacted] was meeting **The Soviets** in **Europe** and Mr. Papich's memorandum does not disclose CIA raised any objection to date. We recognized at the time there could be a jurisdictional problem. (S) We permitted CIA to interview [redacted] in December, 1954, shortly after his recruitment at which time CIA learned from him he had a scheduled espionage meeting in **Switzerland** in March, 1955. (S) On 12/15/54 CIA agreed handling of [redacted] was solely within jurisdiction of Bureau. (S) On 3/2/55, CIA was orally informed [redacted] would meet **Soviets** in **Switzerland** in March, 1955, that we desired CIA to take no action which would interfere with our operation and that results would be furnished CIA (approved by memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 2/25/55). Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/10/57, recommended we not advise CIA of a later meeting between [redacted] and **Soviets** scheduled for 6/10-10/57 in **Switzerland** in interest of security. This was approved and this policy was followed thereafter. (S)

All information from [redacted] was disseminated to CIA and it disclosed our source was meeting **Soviets** at various points in **Europe**. (S) In December, 1968, CIA was advised it could in future contact [redacted] for data he acquired in his world-wide travels providing it did not use him in operational capacity; [redacted] was instructed not to disclose to CIA information on his

1 - 105-25453 (Carport) (S)
LHM:cgc cgc
(7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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(S) relationship with Bureau. It is a fact, however, we did
(S) permit [] under our supervision, to meet [Soviet]
principals outside the United States without clearing
with CIA. We discontinued him as an informant in 1964.

JFKCJ(A)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts
set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DJE

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE
ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/416
ON 1-10-01

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's refusal of a 1958 CIA request for Mr. W. C. Sullivan to lecture on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by James Angleton, CIA requested Mr. Sullivan to address a selected group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S. CIA suggested dates of 12/9, 10, or 11/58. The Director by routing slip attached to Angleton's letter commented, "It seems strange that CIA should seek this when its top representative in considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI. But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont dated 10/1/58 made reference to CIA's request and the Director's comments. It recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served by giving this lecture, not because of the information which could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because it would give Sullivan an opportunity to raise a number of questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture and discussion rather than the converse. Mr. Tolson recommended that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting, "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit."

BCR:hc
(5) hc
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Rachner

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of Mr. Sullivan's other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large 'P' on the left, 'WCS' in the center, 'JFK' to the right of 'WCS', and 'V. 85' on the far right.]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
CASE OF [REDACTED]

JFK (1)(3)

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Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of [REDACTED] that CIA might criticize our not identifying our source. JFK (1)(3)

JFK (1)(3)

BACKGROUND OF CASE [REDACTED] was the CIA employee assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, in 1956, under State Department cover. He became involved with a Russian girl, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) approached him for recruitment, using the affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to carry out the approach. [REDACTED] reported the approach to his superiors and was returned to U. S. and ultimately removed from CIA. JFK (1)(3)

PROBLEM WITH CIA We first learned of this case on 7/9/56 from David Teeple, a consultant to Scott McLeod of State Department, who furnished the information in confidence and who indicated [REDACTED] might have been involved in espionage. On 7/16/56 [REDACTED] Office of Security, CIA, advised SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that the Bureau identify our source. On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised by Director of Security, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed that the request not be made. JFK (1)(3)

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA . This problem never officially arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

62-80750

1 - 65-64084 [REDACTED]

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. T. N. Goble

TNG:as:bjp (7)

JFK (1)(3)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(THE [SLIVA] OPERATION) JFk(1)(A)

*#MOE16 1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ARL/ML 276
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1.6

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses the possible belief of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Legal Attache, [REDACTED] had leaked sensitive information concerning the SLIV case. SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache inquiries of CIA, [REDACTED] and the effect of CIA restrictions on FBI investigations in this case.

In February, 1963, CIA made available information from

[redacted] to the effect that the [redacted] Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA insisted information not be made available to other government agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize its source. CIA then made available extensive information from [redacted] (S) Analysis of the [redacted] revealed several discrepancies which would have made interview by FBI of [redacted] (S) desirable. CIA refused this request. We made numerous requests to obtain clarifying data to explain items mentioned in [redacted] and CIA failed to respond. (S) JFK (1)(A)

(S) In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning JPK (U) (S) interest in American personnel and installations in [redacted] (S) This information was made available to Legal Attache, [redacted] (S) On 4/11/63 CIA advised that its CIA station in [redacted] (S) which had not JPK (U) heretofore been apprised of SLIVA case had made inquiry concerning the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, [redacted] disclosed that

1 - 105-109053 (SLIVA) (S)

LEB: bjpbyf (7)

OBSERVATIONS - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

JFK(1)(B) (S)
JFK(1)(A) (S)
JFK(1)(A) (S)
inquiry of CIA personnel [in] had been made concerning one of the individuals previously identified as an agent and also requests had been made for certain biographical data concerning other individuals. Legal Attache noted that CIA personnel [in] had indicated they were previously aware of the SLIVA case and were impressed with the extreme sensitivity of the case. We furnished this information to CIA headquarters and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache be coordinated in advance with that Agency. This practice was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964, that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on the part of CIA which had been played as a sucker by [] The Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and covered outstanding leads. JFK(1)(A) (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)
JFK(1)(B) (S)
FK(1)(A)
In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened only three agents were uncovered. Original allegations of intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States could not be substantiated. This information, coupled with the fact that CIA refused to make [] available to us for the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision transmitted by us to CIA on 9/30/64 that we were closing our investigation in this case. (S)

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70 CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau in this case. Our review indicates our efforts in the matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative steps. Should any question be raised in the future, we are in a position to document our difficulties experienced with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/FRG
ON 1-10-01

BACKGROUND:

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of leaks to the "National Review" which identified [redacted] former CIA employee, as the leak and referred to former Assistant to the Director Lou Nichols as among his contacts. JFK(1)(B)

PROBLEM:

Papich implies that CIA may have further information regarding Nichols' involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has additional information as to the suggested relationship between [redacted] and Nichols. We do know that they have not made an issue of this matter to date. JFK(1)(B)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HHW:kml/mst
(6)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. H. H. Wallace

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. E.R. Harrell
1 - Mr. R.A. Mullins

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside the U.S. without coordinating with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send a Border Coverage Program (BOCOV) informant to a guerrilla training camp in Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry out revolutions in their home countries. EP 572-S, a Mexican national residing in Juarez, Mexico, which is within the area covered by the BOCOV Program, had infiltrated Cuban and Chinese intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

EP 572-S was an integral part of our top secret BOCOV Program which is handled on a need-to-know basis. We had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip materialized which would fully protect our informant and not jeopardize the BOCOV operation.

OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the trip to Cuba his wife became mentally ill, extremely emotional and temporarily deserted the informant. This strained family relationship caused us to order El Paso to have informant cancel efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

RAM:drl (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After EP 572-S had moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, which is outside our BOCOV area, in November, 1966, we advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our jurisdiction. On 11/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us should it initiate contacts with the informant. There is no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 6/24/68 we discontinued EP 572-S as he was of no further value to us. The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large 'P' on the left, 'WJ' in the center, a checkmark and 'Jaw' on the right, and 'D.B.' in the top right corner.]

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE: 3/6/70

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1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION
IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2ALM/176*
ON *1-10-01*

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA. According to SA Papich, CIA never made any protest although it considered our action a violation of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963 CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to 1961, all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence community by CIA. No attempt was made in the monograph to characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact, this information was attributed to "another Government agency," in accordance with established procedures.

The so-called "third agency rule" provides that classified information originating in a department or agency will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception to this rule provides that the receiving agency may disseminate such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB), of which Bureau is a member, unless the originating agency uses appropriate control markings limiting its data to the use of the receiving agency only. The CIA data used in the Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and USIB members only.

EJO:ekn *ekn*
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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

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The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the intelligence community. It was prepared under emergency conditions for the President and had a significant bearing on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JP ✓ WED 10/7/70 1

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J.E. Gauzens
1 - Mr. A.H. Solomon

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS IN [REDACTED] (S)

11/10/01 MDR/6
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/STG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/6

Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Bureau operation of informants in [REDACTED] and comments on our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at the inception of the operation of these informants. (S)

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first concerns Roberto Francisco Castaneda Felice, an attorney residing in [REDACTED] Our Legat, Mexico, in the Fall of 1966, identified Castaneda as a potential source of intelligence information of importance to U.S. security; conducted appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence information to U.S. Government. By memorandum 11/23/66 it was approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with Castaneda; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be handled with complete security. SA Papich so informed [REDACTED] CIA on 11/25/66. [REDACTED] stated he saw no reason why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headquarters would so inform its representatives in [REDACTED] instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this operation. Since that date we have operated Castaneda as a valuable and productive unpaid confidential source. Since this matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset, there appears to be no problem. (S) JFK (1)(B) (S) JFK (1)(B)

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned Legat, Mexico, informant MEX-65. This individual has cooperated with the Bureau for some 25 years. As a [REDACTED] police official in 1945-47, he was most helpful to our representative assigned in [REDACTED] We had no contact with him thereafter until 1954 when he appeared in Mexico City as a political refugee from [REDACTED] For 11 years thereafter, MEX-65 was operated by our Legat, Mexico, in Mexico. (S)

AHS:dr1 (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS
IN [REDACTED] (S)

SECRET

(S) In April, 1965, MEX-65 returned to [REDACTED] (S) and by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him be continued in [REDACTED] by our Central American road trip Agent. He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on criminal matters as well as those of interest to U.S. security in [REDACTED] (S)

(S) Upon MEX-65's designation as a highly placed police official in [REDACTED] in 1967, we promptly advised CIA headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity. We advised CIA that we had utilized MEX-65 for handling criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information concerning political developments in [REDACTED] (S) At that time, 10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of informant and that after each contact with informant by our road trip Agent, the latter would confer with [REDACTED] (S) JFK (U) (S) [REDACTED] (who was present at CIA headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA cooperation in this matter. On the occasion of our road trip Agent's next contact with [REDACTED] (S) however, [REDACTED] (S) bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of having operated a source in [REDACTED] without CIA's knowledge. He stated that responsibility for the development of security information outside the U. S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that [REDACTED] (S) has been a difficult person with whom to deal and has been inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat, Mexico, and there have been no further indications of difficulty with him. (S) CIA, [REDACTED] (S) has afforded us complete cooperation in our handling of MEX-65 as we were assured it would in the 10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter with CIA. JFK (U) (S)

MEX-65 continues as a very valuable paid informant of our Legat, Mexico. CIA has made favorable comments regarding the excellent quality of the information obtained by MEX-65. This arrangement has worked smoothly for two and one-half years and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fact set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

V-2-
SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ITEM (22) SOLO

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. Strain

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DATE: 3/6/70

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ATG
ON 1-11-01

Item (22), SOLO, in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions that the Bureau could be vulnerable and charged with failure to identify the source and coordinate with them on this matter if they were to become cognizant of the high-level foreign ramifications of this operation.

SOLO is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

This operation basically is performed to gain high-level intelligence concerning the Soviet Union's financial support, domination and control of the CPUSA. Attendant to this objective, our informants have met with and discussed mutual problems with leaders of the various international departments within the Soviet Government. They have also held discussions with CP leaders from other nations.

All information received as a result of this operation which has foreign ramifications has been promptly disseminated to CIA at the highest level.

It has not been considered desirable to identify our sources in this case in view of the sensitivity of the case and the physical danger to the informants.

Considerable security precautions have been carefully built into the SOLO operation both in the field and at the Seat of Government to insure the fullest protection to its security and to the safety of the informants involved. Exposure of the identity of these sources might jeopardize the entire operation.

RS:dlm/lmj
(6)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ITEM (22) SOLO

While former Bureau Agents have gone to work for CIA, there is no information available indicating they have compromised this operation. Of course, they could have done this unknown to us.

The prompt dissemination, to CIA, of information developed through SOLO, which is of interest to that agency, completely fulfills this Bureau's responsibility without needless jeopardy. The mechanics of the operation itself are of no essential significance to CIA.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

[Handwritten initials: B, W, and others]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HARASSMENT OF CIA

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 - Liaison

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Am DR/b
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 REM/jlc
ON 1-11-01

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau check telephone toll calls from the home of one Robert Kenneth Brown who was allegedly harassing CIA [in the Miami area] Brown was JFK(1)(S) supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations. SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U.S. intelligence operations."

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandum, D. J. Brennan, Jr., to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 17, 1967, was prepared. This memorandum encompassed the above facts and recommended that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation was prepared by SA Papich. The Director noted "OK H."

In addition to the above, on December 9, 1967, Brown contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami Office. Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that if Brown did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given to CIA. Brown did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JAM:bcw/bad (6)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. S. Garner
1 - Mr. J. E. Keating (CINAL-
Administrative File)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses the restriction of dissemination of the Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on the distribution list for CINAL received multiple copies. The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CINAL as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CINAL: "Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with a dot those I question as to why they should receive copies and I do not think more than 1 copy should be sent anyone. Let me have your views. H." By memorandum R. W. Smith to W. C. Sullivan 10/6/67, it was stated that although security of the classified document CINAL had been maintained, if the Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would receive only one copy each in the future. Mr. Tolson noted on this memorandum, "Yes. T 10/9." Mr. Tolson also noted, "We could never run down a leak." The Director noted, "Send only 1 copy & if any inquiry, then indicate we have had to cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been followed and only one copy of CINAL has been furnished to those, including CIA, on the CINAL distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RSG:ekn/bad (7)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. J. M. Fitzgerald

DATE: March 7, 1970

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1-11-01 #m0216
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/7TG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 6

[REDACTED] 1960

(S) Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to [REDACTED] by Legal Attache (Legat), Bonn, in 1960 to explore arrangements for liaison with appropriate [REDACTED] authorities. It is given as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with them in line with National Security Council Directives. The U.S. Ambassador to [REDACTED] reportedly raised questions, indicating FBI should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously handled all relations with [REDACTED] authorities. (S) Papich says CIA Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory to all concerned was eventually worked out. Papich also says that in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in Denmark but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark, Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, London, to broaden liaison contacts in Scandinavian countries and told Legat, Bonn, to make exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in [REDACTED] (S) for the same purpose. Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55 that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks for the [REDACTED] (S) only when received through formal State channels, we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with (S) the [REDACTED] regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State (S) approved. State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in [REDACTED] (S) on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention, but it apparently did not get to the Ambassador prior to Legat's trip to [REDACTED] (S)

JFK (S) On 1/4/60 Legat, Bonn, called the [REDACTED] (S) from Germany and arranged to call on them on 1/7/60. The [REDACTED] (S) reported the call to (S) the CIA representative in [REDACTED] who told U. S. Ambassador Philip Young. On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60 from Young in which he said he was disturbed about the manner in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While offering to assist the Bureau, Young spoke of the long standing (S) Contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with [REDACTED] and JFK (S) suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if permanent Bureau liaison with [REDACTED] (S) was planned.

JMF:jan (5)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - 1960

(S)

SECRET

(S) On 1/7/60, Legat met with Ambassador Young and the [REDACTED] He explained JFK(1)(S) that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with [REDACTED] concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal security matters. He said he would not be operational and that the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference with the existing CIA arrangement. (S) While the Embassy officials expressed misgivings that the [REDACTED] might be confused, no request was made to refrain from contacting [REDACTED] (S) The CIA representative said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply. Legat later briefed both Embassy officials on the results of his visit to [REDACTED] who were friendly but deferred a final commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

(S) By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked Ambassador Young for his offer to assist, and said Bureau interests in Scandinavian countries and [REDACTED] were under discussion with Allen Dulles. Young was also assured our proposed contacts with the [REDACTED] were purely liaison in nature; that while we would keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in coordinating with CIA matters taken up with (the [REDACTED]) (S) That Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10, however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

(S) On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and Richard Helms the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and [REDACTED] exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark. When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply with the Directive for coordination of U.S. liaison activities abroad, Helms immediately stated there were no such instances. In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give all possible assistance. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal letter to Ambassador Young which resulted in a joint FBI-[REDACTED]-CIA meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI-[REDACTED] liaison was agreed upon).

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [REDACTED]

- 1960

(S)

SECRET

On memorandum Frohbose to Belmont of 1/14/60, concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and Helms, Director noted : "1. Well handled by Papich. 2. All of the turmoil developing in this situation could have been avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: B., V., W., J., DJS]

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3-6-70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN SERVICE - 1962

- Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by letter 11-7-62 raised questions concerning the propriety of our dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the
- (S) [] Intelligence Service. This concerned certain Committee for State Security (KGB) technical equipment which was obtained from our sensitive Soviet defector in place, Bureau code name Fedora. CIA letter 11-7-62 stated that a representative of
- (S) [] Intelligence Service informed CIA it received aforementioned information from our Legal Attache. CIA claimed such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated with CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.S. liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or involving foreign clandestine services. CIA claimed that pursuant above we were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan 11-9-62 under Fedora caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and 8-1-62 Fedora provided information concerning several types of technical paraphernalia used by KGB. Dissemination of above was made to State Department, CIA and military intelligence agencies by letter on 7-24 and 8-16-62. Information was also furnished to Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelligence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

62-80750

- 1 - 105-104811
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. J. F. Mabey

JFM:plm

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

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CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 am/176
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of interpretation. We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above since we had previously given the information to CIA. This memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.K." and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On 11-13-62 we directed a letter to CIA accordingly. As indicated in memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did not further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and signatures: "B", "V", "W", "J", "DJE"]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-7ALM/216
ON 1-11-01

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
"THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY
DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that Wise and Ross had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies. It was suggested that CIA be advised of this, and the Director noted, "I see no reason for doing so."

Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, 8/28/63, reports this visit and notes that Wise had asked for data concerning the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one exception. He did inquire as to whether there was friction between the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA concerning the visit of Wise and Ross.

We later learned that their book, "The Invisible Government," was furnished in the form of advance proofs to CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Rose

BFR:mlm/mkl
(6)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Rozamus

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#MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1 ALM/TJB
ON 1-11-01

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa. His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. He claims we took the position since we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis. He states that CIA could argue that as early as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, we did not cooperate. He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60 concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60 Herman Horton, Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence, CIA, stated that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most difficult to establish effective penetration. Horton noted that in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable him to develop worthwhile sources. He asked if the Bureau would consider furnishing one of its Negro informants or developing an informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventual use by CIA in Africa. Papich told Horton that if the Bureau had a good Negro informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production. Papich added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau informant, have him travel to Africa under some cover and still be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. Horton said he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give consideration.

MJR:ssr
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to assist CIA. CIA's problem was an administrative one within that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten marks: a checkmark, the initials "WLR", and a signature "J.G."]

[Handwritten stamp: "12575"]

[Handwritten mark: a small star or asterisk]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. W. J. McDonnell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

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#mORIG
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/276
ON 1-11-01

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the White House information received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg wherein the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly the overstaffing of personnel. SA Papich comments that we do not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, Paris, in a letter to the Director dated 10/19/64, set forth the results of a conversation with Ambassador William R. Rivkin at Luxembourg. The latter was assigned by the State Department to conduct a survey of the U.S. intelligence operations in six European countries, assisted by representatives of Defense, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget. Rivkin remarked that the results of the survey were appalling, there being 23,000 military personnel in the six countries engaged in intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel. He described the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as "scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those of the embassies. He made no mention of specific intelligence operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination. Rivkin commented that on his return to the U.S., he intended to see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to his attention.

Rivkin's comments were incorporated in a letter to William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated 10/23/64, in accordance with the Director's noted instructions. Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

WJM:bcw/mkl (5)

mkl

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DT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Haynes

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
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Mohr _____
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Sullivan _____
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#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ITG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had indicated the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before going on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that in April, 1963, Mr. Belmont along with Papich had discussed with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The Bureau, of course, was opposed to this and advised Helms that we would request to make our position known before the board. At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, Helms specifically asked what he should tell McCone and Mr. Belmont told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RHH:wmk/sef
(5)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE: March 6, 1970

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach
FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. L. Whitson

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by Anatoliy Mikhailovich Golitzyn regarding recruitment of four CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE Golitzyn, an intelligence officer of the KGB who defected to CIA in 1961, alleged that the KGB had penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name "Sasha." In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided Golitzyn with information regarding many individuals who had worked for CIA in Germany.

JFK(1)(u) [Igor Orlov, a former employee of CIA] During the course of extensive document reviews Golitzyn became acquainted with background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at the time [Orlov] did. Golitzyn identified four present employees of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-scale investigation of its four employees based solely on Golitzyn's allegations.

JFK(1)(u) DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of allegations by Golitzyn. With regard to any investigation in the United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be made following completion of the investigation of [Igor Orlov] and interviews of [Orlov] and his wife. Based upon the investigation of [Orlov] and the interviews of [Orlov] and his wife, CIA was informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

62-80750

1 - 105-105608 (Golitzyn)

LW:as:bjphje (7)

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SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA
62-80750

SECRET

JFK(1)(B) which supported Golitzyn's speculation that [Orlov] was
instrumental in the recruitment by the Soviets of either
[redacted] and nothing was developed
which would support Golitzyn's allegations against the other
two suspects, [redacted] Furthermore, JFK(1)(B)
CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding [redacted] JFK(1)(B)
[redacted] which would in any way support Golitzyn. The
Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no
investigation of [redacted] We JFK(1)(B)
will interpose no objection, since they are all employees
of your agency, if you wish to pursue Anatoliy Golitzyn's
allegations concerning them, including interviews of the
individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in
(receiving the results of any investigation which would tend
to confirm Golitzyn's conclusions that one or more of these
employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the
Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set
forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: "V", "WML", "J", "DJP"]

²
SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. X. O'Brien

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
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Sullivan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO
SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

#MOR/6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALN/2TG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA information concerning events in Latin America relating to Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter. Papich stated that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to the then Vice President Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third Agency Rule.

Results of Review of Bureau Files

The letter to the then Vice President Nixon is located in Bureau file 62-88461-117. It contains summary of information relating to riots and attacks against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58 Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

62-80750

FXO:dgo/sef (6)

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Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

~~SECRET~~

FMOR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/316
ON 1-11-01

source of the information set forth in our letter. The last paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the individual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your arrival in a particular country. Therefore, there is a question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist organizations which would have led to the development of information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958. The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director had a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as the first sentence of the above letter reads as follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum Mr. R. R. Roach to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for the Director's information. The Director noted on this memorandum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with instructions, a letter was sent to the then Attorney General under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary of CIA information in the same manner as had been sent to Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958. Our letter to the Attorney General, however, did not contain any observations regarding CIA coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and his party.

Our file in this matter (62-88461-150) indicates that on June 9, 1958, Colonel Robert Cushman in the office of the then Vice President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

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of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the press. Colonel Cushman's request was set forth in memorandum G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson June 9, 1958, with the recommendation that Colonel Cushman be advised that if the information were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information should not be given to the press. Both Mr. Tolson and the Director agreed with the recommendation, and Colonel Cushman was advised of our decision. It is noted that Colonel Cushman is identical with the individual who is now Deputy Director of CIA.

Comments on Remarks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

1. That most of the information in our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came from CIA and that this letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the information which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we clearly indicated in our letter that the source was CIA. With regard to any question being raised as to the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader of the CIA reports - - that is, that the information from CIA popped up rather suddenly as related to the country and Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he was personally involved in demonstrations directed against him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that advance information from our responsible intelligence agency (CIA) may have been lacking.

2. We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

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personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff. As indicated above, Colonel Cushman, who was a member of Mr. Nixon's staff in 1958 and who is now a Deputy Director of CIA, was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents. We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our 5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a Government agency from disseminating information originating with another Government agency in the absence of specific authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly identified as having originated with CIA. This letter was apparently prepared at the specific request of then Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DIB

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. J. H. Gale
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HERBERT ITKIN

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
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Item number 33 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Herbert Itkin as an individual who was operated as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that the Bureau acquired access to Itkin through the CIA and that although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned "James Hoffa" set out that James Angleton of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General concerning a source whom Mr. Angleton had used since World War II and who subsequently has developed a close association with a lawyer who does considerable work for the Teamsters Unions. Angleton's source was confident that the lawyer could be developed as a penetration which could "sink" Hoffa and all of his cohorts. The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

Mr. Angleton set up the first contact with the individual who had the contact with the attorney and at that time Angleton stated that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible. As a result, eventual contact was made with Herbert Itkin who developed into a very productive source. Itkin has been publicly identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his testimony.

JGD:rmm (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HERBERT ITKIN

SECRET

The Bureau's success in handling Itkin can be attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York Office because Itkin is a highly emotional individual and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures from his many business associates; therefore, it took a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us originally in touch with this source, it was not believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA and explain to them our success or to thank them for giving us this original lead. It is also noted that there is an obligation upon Government agencies to cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this matter was in accordance with the long standing policy among all Government agencies.

Review of Itkin's file does not reflect any instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch with Itkin. This is in line with Mr. Angleton's statement in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large 'B' with a checkmark, 'W.H.', 'J.', and 'D.E. 100']

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. I. W. Conrad

DATE: March 7, 1970

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states CIA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. He states that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA. Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use or inspection. They have also furnished technical manuals obtained abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of some of their operations abroad. Laboratory personnel have been afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969, CIA afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning a Clandestine Transmitter Activator, developed by their technical people and offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important technical information to CIA over a period of many years. Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to 1955 an important unsolved technical intelligence problem involved desired access to enemy intelligence and other security information

FJC:sef
(7)

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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protected by combination-type locks (safe doors, and the like). Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were able to solve this problem by using X-rays from radioactive materials to "see" into the interior of a combination lock and thus recover the combination, without trace of tampering or other indication that the lock had been compromised. This was a scientific breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and, with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were made known to the appropriate CIA representatives. CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to solve the same problem. The impact of this scientific discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and CIA.

In approximately the late 50's and early 60's, both CIA and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type of secret writing placed into use by the Russians for communicating with espionage agents. In spite of a massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling the basic principles and techniques underlying this new Russian system. This important breakthrough thus permitted for the first time a successful attack against the new Russian secret ink communication system. Because of its extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval, this development was made known to CIA, and its importance to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA, under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in part, "For the past several years there has been increasingly effective technical liaison between the Technical Services Division of this Agency and corresponding components of your Bureau. . ." Dulles further commented that Bureau technical personnel had " . . . made an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to be highly commended. Their work not only has an important impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a chemical mechanism from which may well stem new high-level secret writing systems. The discovery will have an

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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important influence on the discharge of responsibilities assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider access to these findings to be further evidence of the value of close technical liaison between our two organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available to CIA actual Soviet secret writing chemicals and methods of development which had come into the possession of the Bureau through investigative activity and through high-level informants. A recent example involved the Russian espionage case of Herbert William Boeckenhaupt wherein on 2/12/69 a sample of secret writing material used by Boeckenhaupt to communicate with the Russians was furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JK P V WEL k

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. H. Atkinson

Tolson _____
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Holmes _____
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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS
EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
ON 1-1-01

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to discuss training problems with FBI training staff in view of necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and security agencies. Following recommendations by the Executives Conference, Bureau advised CIA by letter May 25, 1950, that we did not believe FBI training staff could intelligently discuss training methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

Since 1962, we have taken foreign police officers into the National Academy through the Agency for International Development (AID). These officers spent two weeks of orientation with AID and after graduation certain selective officers have been in touch with CIA through AID. We are aware that CIA has used many of these graduates as sources of information.

In 1966, the Director approved a request of CIA to have one of its men attend the National Academy for purpose "to improve capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training programs." As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the 77th Session of the FBI National Academy (March 7 - May 25, 1966).

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962, and December, 1969.

WHA:mbm
(7)
mbm

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On The Record," "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations." We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at Bureau training schools and there is no indication in Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Training Division.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. L. M. Linton
1 - Mr. E. R. Harrell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

#MDR16 1-11-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JIG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

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Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief that more aggressive action should have been taken in field of collecting positive intelligence in the United States. Papich notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when political crises occur in some country. He points out CIA belief that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants and collection of cryptographic material. Papich cites two specific cases occurring in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage, suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delineated to field by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC letter calls for guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA.

Enclosure

ERH:bjpt
(7)

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States and forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

*Our position is, we are
willing to try with an
exchange*

WEL

Jan

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DETAILS:

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Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of such information. He notes we investigate subversives, spies, and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and that facets of these investigations of violations of United States laws serve to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred to by us as investigations of internal security matters. Papich notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence field has been restricted to the compliance with requests by State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich, CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the problem. Papich cites two cases (S) [redacted] 10/69 and (S) [redacted] 10/69) where CIA requests for technical surveillance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that these matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the Attorney General.

Specific Cases

(S) CIA advised that [redacted]

(S) [redacted] had been under development by [redacted] intelligence service partly as a result of his weakness for women when assigned in [redacted] (S) from [redacted] (S) [redacted] was to participate in bilateral talks with United States officials in [redacted] (S) By letter (S) [redacted] CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on (S) [redacted] The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority of the AG. I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel." (S)

(S) [redacted] was originally investigated by us in [1965] as a possible unregistered agent of the [redacted] Government due to negotiations by him with [redacted] officials designed to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in [redacted] (S) (S)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Our investigation showed close contact by [] with [] (S) officials, [] and details of activity by that subject to create the firm mentioned. (S) [] headed a [] firm involved in Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC. Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not justify soliciting [] registration as a foreign agent. (S)

(S) In Spring of 1965, sixty-one kilograms of nuclear material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed by [] but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a diversion of nuclear material on the part of [] to unauthorized persons or government. (S)

CIA, in 1968, became alarmed on receipt of information of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification for reopening investigation. Richard Helms of CIA contacted the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine advisability of additional investigation. The Director, in approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisability of getting into this. It looks like Helms is going around us to AG as he suspects we would say no." (S)

(S) An intensive investigation of [] conducted during late [1968] and into Fall of [1969] revealed no positive intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of AEC material to [] (S) Our investigation included technical surveillances installed 9/27/68 and discontinued 9/4/69. [] (S) was interviewed by AEC 8/14/69 and disclaimed passing any classified data to [] (S) Facts of case were reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence of prosecutable violation by [] (S) AEC felt the additional investigation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised. A 10/13/69 letter from Helms acknowledged additional investigation. (S)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
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(S) would produce no legal evidence pertinent to the issue which prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstituted audio surveillances of [] would produce positive intelligence information. He therefore requested reinstitution of this coverage. The Director's letter to Helms 10/17/69 noted that after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this matter to the Attorney General. (S)

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by Special Agent Papich that in the future CIA should transmit its requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States to the Attorney General. This specifically covered the cases of [] (S) The Director commented "Right."

Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests, changes inherent in faster communication, hysteria to facilitate international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United States. On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with CIA, the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the field and Bureau officials results of the conferences with CIA and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. This SAC letter (copy attached) emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director noted "I hope there is no 'sneaker' in this. Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there been any indication that such requests have been sent by CIA to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired coverage at some time in the future.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

(S)

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME raised questions, pointing out that over

Again, could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate in line with National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated DATE, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the FOREIGN Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive *FOREIGN* sources *CODENAME*. We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad, CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue

[redacted] that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(27) TITLE OF BOOK
AUTHOR

BOOK AUTHORED BY

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that *AUTHOR* in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. *AUTHOR* contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that *AUTHOR* preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. *AUTHOR* subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA.

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

[redacted]

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[redacted] We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue

[redacted] that we did not cooperate.

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the SOURCE He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information.

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

SECRET

JFK (1)(B)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, [redacted] and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1-17-01 #moe/cg
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/1716
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

JFK (1)(B)

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[Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States]

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

JFK (1)(B)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

for Buch ANA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example, WFO handles leads to interview the Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, who is under CIA control and support.

[REDACTED] (S) JFK (1)(B)

In addition [REDACTED]

No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

GAD:mlm
(7)

6/25/70 ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON.

I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter.

CT:DSS ENCLOSURE


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SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

JFK (1)(B)

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OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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[Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States]

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

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- 2 -

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/25/65

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALW/JFE

JFK(1)(b)

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

JFK(1)(b)

[REDACTED] Chief, [REDACTED] Office, [REDACTED]

JFK(1)(b)

JFK(1)(b)

JFK(1)(b)

JFK(1)(b)

JFK(1)(b)

Arrangements were perfected wherein Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact [REDACTED] and he will place them in contact with the [REDACTED] representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the [REDACTED] relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

JFK(1)(b)

[REDACTED] requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that [REDACTED] not be identified as the source in the event

JFK(1)(b)

JFK
(1)(b)

information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. [redacted] was assured that [redacted] in this regard would be fully protected.

JFK
(1)(b)

[redacted]

[redacted] He suggested the same procedure be followed for cases in [redacted] as is contemplated for the [redacted] Office territory. That is, that this office contact him, furnishing the identity of the Subject and the name and location of the Special Agent handling the case. He then will have his representative covering the area contact the FBI Agent and they then can discuss information of mutual interest on the case. He advised that [redacted], where the bulk of these cases are located in [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] covers the [redacted]

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts [redacted] in these cases, it is anticipated that [redacted] may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the [redacted] and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

JFK(1)(b)

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with [redacted] envisages the furnishing of reports and letterhead memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.

JFK(1)(b)